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The economic crisis of the end of the 1970’s, which consumed Western Europe, 
worsened Yugoslavia’s economic situation. The problems in deliveries of food caused 
street demonstrations and strikes, as well as an intensification in emigration at the 
beginning of the 1980’s. The problems worsened in repayments of foreign debt, high 
inflation, unemployment, as well as difficulties in the socio-political situation of the 
country. With the death of Tito in 1980, the state lost the man whose power had been 
the most important element integrating the country. When he began to lose power, the 
local party took over and began assembling men of the same nationality. During this 
time, the federal line of policy had less and less influence over the state. It is important 
to note that national rebirth played an important role in the process of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia – mainly in Serbia (for which the events in Kosovo in 1981 were 
important). Nationalist feelings significantly increased after Slobodan Milosewic 
assumed leadership in 1987. He wanted to give Kosovo and Vojevodina autonomy as 
well as to dominate the whole federation. The fall of communist regimes in Central 
Europe and the weakness of the Soviet Union in 1989 accelerated the development of 
incidents in Yugoslavia significantly. The threat of invasion by Warsaw Pact armies 
had disappeared and this was one of the more important integrating factors. The 
indivisibility of communist power was questioned by the appearance of various 
national political movements. This doubtless had a weakening effect on the country’s 
unity. The appearance of separatist movements in that period in Central Europe shows 
clearly that the endeavours of small nations to obtain independence could end 
successfully.  
The changes in the constitution of Yugoslavia on 28 March, 1989, by which 
Kosovo and Vojevodina were given autonomy, had a powerful effect on other 
republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia. On 23 December, 1990, a referendum took 
place in Slovenia in which 88% of the population voted for independence.1 In turn, on 
26 December the president of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, declared independence. Similar 
confederation demands were made by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as 
Macedonia. However, federal and Serbian powers rejected these proposals. 
In March 1991 Slobodan Milosewic announced officially that Serbia would not 
have to pay federal taxes. At the end of March, the leaders of the self-appointed 
Serbian republic of Krajina announced the secession of this province, and they began 
to define the borders of their state. In turn, Serbs living in eastern Slovenia also began 
secession preparations. Soon after this, Croatian workers were expelled from the 
national park in Plitvice by Serbian Police, and it was announced that the park would 
be annexed to Krajina. Members of the Croatian police were sent to the site. On 1 
April, Serbs from Krajina announced its annexation to Serbia. Clashes began at this 
time, and fortifications began in Krajina and Slovenia. 
On 19 May, a referendum took place in Croatia, in which 95% voted in favour of 
the creation of an independent and sovereign state. The president of Croatia, Franjo 
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Tudjman, appointed the national armed forces (the National Guard), and he began 
preparations for defence. On 25 March, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia announced 
independence simultaneously. In response, the federal forces began a military 
operation with the aim of gaining control over the rebellious republics, which would 
later be recognised as the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which lasted 
to the end of 1995.  
From the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia the United Nations 
(UN) was involved in the process of finding a peace solution. On 23 November, 1991, 
the UN General Secretary met in Geneva with the presidents of Serbia and Croatia as 
well as the secretary of the Yugoslavia Defence State. An agreement was reached 
which resulted in an immediate ceasefire (the fourteenth in the course of the war and 
the first under patronage of the UN), the unblocking of the barracks in Croatia, and the 
withdrawing from the republic of the Yugoslavian military forces. 
Each side of the conflict expressed the desire for an immediate peace operation, 
which they confirmed by approving of the UN peace plan.2 This provided the basis for 
the UN Court to pass the Resolution No. 743 on 21 February, 1992, in which United 
Nation Protection Forces in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) were created, initially for a 
period of twelve months.3 The peace forces were composed of about 13 thousand 
soldiers, 530 police officers, and 500 civil workers. The military and civil staff came 
from 37 different countries, the majority of which were permanent UN workers. 
An important event for the region’s future was the acknowledgement of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s independence on 6 April, 1992, by the European Community and 
Canada, and a day later by the United States.4 
Poland was one of twelve countries that sent an operational battalion to aid in the 
realisation of tasks within the framework of the peace operation – UNPROFOR – in 
the former Yugoslavia (on the basis of UN Court resolution No. 749). An infantry 
battalion was created on 27 March, 1992, as the result of the Polish Army General Staff 
Chief’s instructions and an order from Silesian District Commander No. Pf 22 on 16 
March, 1992.5 The unit consisted of 888 persons,6 later increasing to 1,020 soldiers.7 It 
was created on the basis of Silesian District units, and training was conducted in the 
Military Preparation Centre for UN Peace Operations located in Kielce (commanding 
personnel) and in Opole (soldiers). The battalion for the first rotation travelled in 
several railway transports to Slunj.8 On 15 April, 1992, the preparations of the Polish 
military camps were begun. At the end of April, the Polish battalion began to execute 
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the peace tasks (observation in appointed areas of responsibility, patrolling, controlling 
the movement of vehicles and people, and escorting the convoys with humanitarian 
aid).9 
The Polish battalion cooperated in peace operations with different countries on the 
terrain of the former Yugoslavia, and personnel was enlarged to 1,298 soldiers and 
civil workers at the beginning of 1995.10 However, due to the limited forces and weak 
armament of the UNPROFOR, ineffective UN and Western European Union peace 
policies, as well as a renewal of war activity, the Polish battalion and various peace 
units were unable to convince the local military and civil population of the warnings of 
the peace agreements. The causes of this situation were, first of all, the lack of heavy 
armament (connected with the mandate of the operation) and, secondly, a delayed and 
insufficient reaction from the international community to changes in the Balkans.11 
Therefore, the conditions in which Polish soldiers had to execute tasks were 
particularly difficult. An example of the soldiers’ helplessness is the murder of several 
thousand Bosnian Moslems in Srebrenica (July 1995) in the presence of UNPROFOR 
soldiers from the Dutch battalion.12 
The prolonging of war activity and in particular the multiethnic conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina led NATO to support UN peace efforts.13 The peace activities were 
connected with supervising and protecting the embargo warnings on weapons 
deliveries put on all the republics of the new Yugoslavia by the UN Safety Court. In 
October 1992, NATO planes (with the AWACS system) began monitoring the no-fly 
zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 and 11 April, 1994, following an order from 
the commanding staff of UNPROFOR, there were air strikes with the aim of protecting 
Gorażde (the city was declared a safe zone by the UN Court). The first air-attack by 
NATO forces in Bosnia was on 5 August, 1994, when Bosnian Serbs took weapons 
from a protected store-house in the vicinity of Sarajevo. The bombing of Pale, the 
Bosnian Serb capital (25 May, 1995), was one of the most spectacular actions carried 
out by NATO air forces. 
However, the actions undertaken by NATO air forces did not bring about the 
desired effects. The Serbian units in Bosnia were the targets of air raids. They made 
attempts to take hostages.14 On 3 June, 1995, the decision was made in Paris about the 
creation in Bosnia of the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), which was intended to increase 
UNPROFOR safety and to help the besieged enclaves in eastern Bosnia. However, the 
United States affirmed that US forces could support NATO air and logistic operations 
within the framework of UN peace operations. With regard to the lack of effects of UN 
and European Union political interventions, the White House took over the initiative. 
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The United States worked together with NATO air forces to lead an almost 20-day air-
operation (28 August–17 September 1995), which led to a settlement between the 
opposing sides of the local fighting forces. 
The effective mediation of the US secretary of state, Richard Holbrooke, had a 
significant influence on negotiating a peace agreement. There was an initial meeting of 
the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Croatia, 
Franjo Tudman, and the president of Serbia, Slobodan Miloszevic, on 21 November, 
1995, in Dayton (American air-base). A peace arrangement was signed on 14 
December, 1995, in Paris. The IFOR – Implementation Forces – were created, 
comprising 60 thousand soldiers,15 with the aim of replacing the UN peace forces 
(UNPROFOR) on 20 December, 1995, and supporting NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. 
The organised peace forces under NATO leadership were the result of changes in 
international and NATO policy which was connected with the providing of mutual 
support.16 
Apart from NATO members, IFOR was made up of countries co-operating within 
the framework of the programme “Partnership for Peace,” as well as Russian units 
acting on autonomic principles. Generally, in peace support operations the 
representatives of 32 countries took part.17 The logistic protection was organised in 
Taszar and Kaposvar, located on Hungarian territory (at former Russian military 
bases). 
After creating the international IFOR, on 16 December, 1995, NATO published 
Operational Plan No. 10405 (SACEUR OPLAN 10405) to execute the multinational 
operation “Joint Endeavour.”18 Moreover, the United States agreed to arm and train the 
army of the Croatian-Moslem Federation, in order to create a counterweight for 
Serbian military power in this region.19 
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Source: Newsletter No. 97-1 “Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) from Operation Joint 
Endeavor,” Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1997 
 
Outline 1. Structure of Multinational Division “North” in IFOR 
The American Multinational Division “North” was composed of the following 
brigades: Nordic-Polish, Russian, Turkish and two American brigades. 
On 6 December, 1995, Poland was invited to take part in the IFOR operation 
officially. A day earlier, the Polish government undertook Resolution No. 141/95 in the 
matter of the creation of the Polish military contingent in the Implementation Forces in 
Bosnia (IFOR).20 On this basis, the Ministry of Defence provided the necessary 
documents in order to form and prepare the battalion to execute tasks in the Balkans.21 
The IFOR battalion was the first Polish unit to take part in a NATO peace 
operation.22 Earlier, from 1973 the Polish military contingents had executed mainly 
logistic tasks, or had operated (from 1992) in UN peace missions.  
The Polish battalion was mainly formed on the basis of the 16th Air-attack Battalion 
of the 6th Air-attack Brigade from Kraków.23 This unit together with battalions from 
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Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway composed the Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORD-
POL BDe), which was in charge of northern Bosnia. The contingents were part of the 
American Multinational Division “North” (MND), the staff of which was located in 
Tuzla. 
The Polish unit calculated about 650 soldiers of the 16th Air-attack Battalion.24 The 
battalion was composed as follows: command and staff of the battalion, supply and 
command company, three assault companies (located in: Banja Vrućica on the Serbian 
side, in Jelah on the Moslem side and Jurisicia near Żepće on the Croatian side), and a 
support company.25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AIMON, 1675.00.18, Uchwała nr 141/95 Rady Ministrów z dn. 5.12.1995 r. w sprawie 
polskiego kontyngentu wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 186–189; 
AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z 13.12.1995 r. w sprawie 
sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni 
(IFOR), c. 177–181; AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja Nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej w 
sprawie sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych 
w Bośni (IFOR), 13.12.1995 r., c. 177–180; AIMON, 1675.00.1, Zarządzenie szefa Sztabu 
Generalnego WP nr 136/Sztab z 15.12.1995 r. w sprawie przygotowania 16 bpd do składu Sił 
Implementacyjnych (IFOR) w ramach operacji NATO w Bośni i Hercegowinie i funkcjonowania 
batalionu w rejonie misji, c. 171–176. 
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Outline 2. Structure of the Polish Battalion in IFOR (1996) 
The main tasks of the Polish Battalion in IFOR were: supervising the zone of 
separation, patrolling the area of responsibility, assurance of freedom of movement for 
peace forces, maintenance on the main roads at permanent check-points, control of 
local military forces and humanitarian activity.26  
The Polish-American co-operation in IFOR unrolled within the framework of peace 
tasks already underway. The Poles received battle support from the American division, 
and near the Polish battalion functioned a permanent team of fire support (FIST). 
Moreover, combined Polish-American patrols were organised as well as related 
activities with representatives of local military units.27 
On the basis of UN Safety Court Resolution No. 1088 of 12 December, 1996, the 
Stabilisation Forces (SFOR) were created. They comprised about 35 thousand 
soldiers.28 The termination of SFOR began on 20 December, 1996. Although the 
terminating operation was planned to take only 18 months, it has been prolonged and is 
still taking place today. Poland decided to also participate in the SFOR operating 
battalion force.29 The contingent’s personnel underwent changes: there were 435 
soldiers and civil workers in 1998, increasing to 492 persons in the second half of 
1999.30 The battalion force was reduced to two assault companies, and the support 
company was also withdrawn from Bosnia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
26 D. Kozerawski, The Participation of Polish Military Units in Peace Operations in 1992–1999, 
“Sbornik VVŚ”, PV, nr 1, Vyśkov 2004, p. 131; Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt..., p. 118–119. 
27 In polish area of responsibility were located: Serbian, Croatian and Muslims local military units.  
28 R. Zięba, op.cit., p. 149. 
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Source: AIMON, 1675.00.1, Uchwała nr 146/96 Rady Ministrów z dnia 17.12.1996 r. w sprawie 
utworzenia Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Stabilizacyjnych w Bośni (SFOR), c. 165–
167; AIMON, 1675.00.23, Etat nr 29/174/0, Polska Jednostka Wojskowa w siłach Wielonarodowych 
w republice Bośni i Hercegowiny – SFOR, 6.03.1999 r., c. 5–6. 
Outline 3. Structure of the Polish Battalion in SFOR (1997–1999) 
The basic tasks of the Polish battalion in SFOR were:31 controlling all sides of the 
conflict by inspecting local forces’ weapons and equipment, monitoring local military 
activity, maintaining liaison contacts with both sides of the conflict, co-operating with 
the CIMIC, patrolling designated areas, providing on order Quick Reaction Forces 
(QRF) in the platoon level, and supervising, monitoring and clearing mine fields.  
During the SFOR operation within the framework of peace tasks, Polish-American 
co-operation developed. Similarly, during the IFOR operation, in the Polish SFOR 
battalion, the American fire support team closely co-operated with Polish soldiers. The 
co-operation took place on a wider scale and involved contact with the civil population 
in the Polish zone of responsibility. Joint social patrols were organised, reaching many 
settlements with the aim of giving humanitarian aid (often to refugees and emigrants). 
Joint training was organised by the CMIC and included psychological activity,32 
with the aim of building among the local population a positive image of peace forces. 
Joint informative workshops were organised at schools (with the aim of passing on to 
children and youth accessories or interesting press distributed by SFOR and 
international organisations).  
The Polish and American soldiers, supported by the other battalions of the NORD-
POL Brigade, led many operations, a good example of which is “Harvest.” This 
operation was connected with taking weapons and ammunition away from the local 
population and various centres, with the aim of making the Bosnian region safer.  
In 1998, international parachuting jumps were organised in Tuzla in which 
commanders and soldiers took part from Polish, American and Russian units.  
The realisation of peace tasks within the framework of the IFOR and SFOR 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1996–1999 was very meaningful 
for the development of Polish-American military co-operation, and permitted the 
following: 
– the breaking of mutual barriers and the building of confidence; 
– the improvement of the level of mandatory task realisation;  
– the training of commands, staffs and units with common aims and activity 
procedures; 
– the exchange of operating information in areas of responsibility; 
– mutual battle support (from the American side – artillery, helicopters and aviation) 
and logistic support during peace task realisation; 
– linguistic improvement. 
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At the beginning of January 2000, the Nordic-Polish Brigade was displaced – its 
tasks were taken over by the smaller Nordic-Polish Battle Group.33 In the new SFOR 
operation, about 300 Polish military and civilian personnel have been conducting peace 
tasks. A significant part of the peace forces was sent to other regions of the world and 
Europe (for instance to Kosovo and Afghanistan).  
The Polish units’ participation in international peace operations organised by the 
UN changed the character of the executed tasks significantly. Earlier experiences had 
been primarily connected to logistic tasks. Polish soldiers’ attendance in peace 
operations had an effect on their preparations and equipment. The political-military 
situation in areas of peace missions created additional difficulties and threats.  
The attendance of Polish contingents in peace operations in the Balkans, mostly 
under NATO command, served as practical skill-assessment tests alongside other 
NATO members within the framework of the “Partnership for Peace” programme. 
Moreover, this situation offered Poland a chance to prove its rightful membership in 
NATO. 
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